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WE HAVE A "PURPOSE" REQUIREMENT IFWE CAN KEEP IT
by
James F. Flanagan
The Supreme Court in Giles v. California held that a defendant forfeits
the right to confront a witness only when he purposefully keeps the
witness away. Many see the "purpose" requirement as an unjustified bar
to the use of victim hearsay, particularly in domestic violence
prosecutions where victims often refuse to appear. The author defends
Giles as a correct reading of history, and independently justified by long-
standing precedent that constitutional trial rights can only be lost by
intentional manipulation of the judicial process. Moreover, the purpose
requirement does not prevent prosecutions or convictions because the
definition of testimonial hearsay is narrow, other victim hearsay often is
available, and prosecutors have proven "purpose" for decades.
Nevertheless, the purpose requirement of Giles, and ultimately
Crawford's protection of the Confrontation Clause, will be undermined
unless the courts require strict "but for" proof of the reason for the
witness's absence, including proof that the witness did not have
independent personal reasons for avoiding testifying. The government's
good faith obligation to produce witnesses must be strengthened to avoid
making forfeiture so easy that there is a perverse incentive to rely on it,
rather than diligently seeking and producing witnesses. The author
concludes by identifying the problems in using expert testimony to infer
causation only from a prior history of domestic discord.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The struggle to maintain the Constitution that Benjamin Franklin
predicted is the same that faces the newly strengthened Confrontation• 2
Clause created by Crawford v. Washington. Crawford finally gave the
Confrontation Clause teeth by barring testimonial hearsay unless there
was an opportunity for cross-examination. Giles v. California limited
forfeiture by wrongdoing, the most significant exception to Crawford, by
holding that it required proof that the defendant acted with the purpose
of preventing the witness from testifying.'
The Symposium on the Confrontation Clause organized by Professor
Beloof came at an opportune time. Giles completes a trilogy of cases that
created the Confrontation Clause's modern approach to hearsay, defined
testimonial hearsay, and limited forfeiture by wrongdoing. Yet Giles
reveals clear strains about Crawford, and the intent requirement in the
context of domestic violence prosecutions where witness intimidation
occurs often. Similar strains appear in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
which held that crime lab reports are testimonial hearsay requiring that
the defendant have the opportunity to cross-examine the technician.4
The Court in Giles, which had been united in its two earlier decisions
on the Confrontation Clause,' produced five opinions in a 6-3 decision.6
They reveal two fault lines. The first is the significance of history in
' Franklin was approached by a woman on the last day of the Constitutional
Convention and asked whether the convention had created a republic or a monarchy.
Franklin replied: "A republic ... if [we] can keep it." 3 REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787,85 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Giles, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor concurred in Crawford, 541 U.S.
at 69-76, andJustice Thomas concurred in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833-42
(2006). The concurring justices did not comment on the forfeiture doctrine in either
case.
6 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2695 (justices Breyer, Stevens, and Kennedy dissenting).
554 [Vol. 13:3
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defining the Confrontation Clause. Justice Scalia and the Chief Justice
found the intent requirement solely in the history of the Confrontation7
Clause. Justices Thomas and Alito concurred in the Court's opinion, but
would have held that the statement to the officer was not testimonial
hearsay, had that issue not been conceded in the lower court.8 Justices
Souter and Ginsburg also concurred, finding that the case law required a
showing of intent, and that it was equitable to place the burden of untrue
hearsay on the person who kept the witness away, but that history said
nothing about forfeiture in the context of domestic violence. 9 Justice
Breyer, joined by Justices Kennedy and Stevens, rejected the majority's
view of history and sought to find the answer in the purposes of the
rule.' This topic has been ably addressed at the symposium by Robert
Kry, the author of the amicus brief in Giles on behalf of National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers," and Professors Davies and
Mosteller, who are well-known commentators on history, evidence, and
the Constitution.
The second fault line is the future application of forfeiture by
wrongdoing particularly in domestic violence prosecutions. Professors
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Tom Lininger, and Richard Friedman have
commented on this topic and it is the focus of my Article. As a counsel
for Dwayne Giles in the Supreme Court, and with an interest in forfeiture
by wrongdoing that predated Crawford, I believe that Giles was correctly
decided . In fact, without a purpose or intent requirement, Crawford
would be of limited use, perhaps relevant to statements by co-defendants,
but with little impact whenever the prosecution could mount a plausible
claim that the witness's absence could be connected to the defendant.
The particular challenge of domestic violence prosecutions is that
the complaining witnesses often are reluctant to testify or do not testify at
all. Witness intimidation is responsible for much of this, but it is





Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioner, Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008) (No. 07-6053).
12 James F. Flanagan, Foreshadowing the Future of Forfeiture/Estoppel by Wrongdoing:
Davis v. Washington and the Necessity of the Defendant's Intent to Intimidate the Witness, 15
J.L. & POL'y 863 (2007) [hereinafter Flanagan, Foreshadowing the Future]; James F.
Flanagan, Confrontation, Equity, and the Misnamed Exception for "Forfeiture" by
Wrongdoing, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs.J. 1193, 1209-18 (2006) [hereinafter Flanagan,
Confrontation, Equity, and the Misnamed Exception]; James F. Flanagan, Forfeiture by
Wrongdoing and Those Who Acquiesce in Witness Intimidation: A Reach Exceeding its Grasp
and Other Problems with Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), 51 DRAKE L. REv. 459 (2003)
[hereinafter Flanagan, A Reach Exceeding its Grasp].
2009]
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reasons for not, wanting to make themselves available in court.1 3 Giles
properly distinguishes between the two situations by requiring proof of
the goal or intent to keep the witness away, and by proof that the
defendant's wrongdoing was, in fact, the cause of the witness's failure to
appear, rather than the witness's independent decision, or the
government's failure to produce the witness.
My concern is that the understandable zeal to convict domestic
batterers will lead to minimal standards for proof of intent and causation
and will undermine the constitutional protections in Giles, ultimately
making it easier to use testimonial hearsay than to produce the witness at
trial. Crawford and Giles do not unreasonably restrict the prosecution of
these cases and they are easily satisfied by proper investigation and
prosecution. I also advocate a strong "but for" proof of causation of the
witness's absence, an enhanced "due diligence" standard for the
government to satisfy before a witness may be found unavailable, and
conclude with some criticisms and concerns about attempting to
establish causation and unavailability solely through evidence of a history
of domestic violence.
II. GILES AND THE INTENT REQUIREMENT
DO NOT SOLELY DEPEND UPON HISTORY
I have little to offer on the history of the Confrontation Clause that
has not been said. For me, the most significant fact is that all the
forfeiture cases from 1666 until Crawford were obvious witness tampering14
cases. The cases that found forfeiture without such tampering were
decided after, and often explicitly to avoid, Crawford. There is only one
13 Tom Lininger, Yes, Virginia, There is a Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L. REv.
401, 407 (2005); Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford's
Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 311, 361-62 (2005).
" Lord Morley's Case was a pre-trial ruling in a murder case, holding that the
sworn statement of a witness taken at a coroner's inquest could be admitted if the
witness had been kept away by "the means or procurement of the prisoner." Kel. 53,
55, 84 Eng. Rep. 1079, 1080, 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 771 (H.L. 1666). The prosecution
failed to establish Lord Morley's responsibility at trial. Lord Morley's Case, 6 How. St.
Tr. at 776-77. In Reynolds v. United States the defendant concealed the witness. 98 U.S.
145 (1879). The modern cases on forfeiture by wrongdoing all involved witness
tampering. See, Flanagan, A Reach Exceeding its Grasp, supra note 12, at 484-87
(describing witnesses and intimidation in the modern cases).
15 The California Supreme Court in Giles admitted that forfeiture without intent
was a reaction to Crawford. "After Crawford, the response of many courts (including
the Court of Appeal in this case) was to focus on the equitable forfeiture rationale
which could eliminate the need for evidence of witness tampering and broaden the
scope of the rule to all homicide cases." People v. Giles, 152 P.3d. 433, 440 (Cal.
2007), rev'd sub nom. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008). Similarly, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court stated: "In essence, we believe that in a post-Crawford world
the broad view of forfeiture by wrongdoing ... utilized by various jurisdictions since
Crawford's release is essential." State v.Jensen, 727 N.W.2d 518, 535 (Wis. 2007).
[Vol. 13:3
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pre-Crawford case that suggests that intent may be unnecessary.' 6 The
Court's ultimate rationale for Giles was the lack of support for the
California Supreme Court's position that a homicide automatically
forfeited a constitutional right. The opinion for the Court concludes:
"We decline to approve an exception to the Confrontation Clause
unheard of at the time of the founding or for 200 years thereafter."1 7 The
State of California simply failed to carry the burden of establishing a new
exception to the Confrontation Clause.
The debate over the relevance of the history of the Confrontation
Clause, however, does not undercut the purpose requirement established
in Giles. There is independent support for the decision and the purpose
requirement. Witness tampering is one example of a long established
rule that a defendant can forfeit constitutional protections by attempting
to improperly manipulate constitutional rights to the derogation of the
integrity of the judicial process.
Reynolds v. United States, the original forfeiture by wrongdoing case,
was one of the first cases illustrating the principle. 8 Reynolds held that the
defendant could not conceal the witness yet insist on his right to
confront the now absent witness.' 9 Nor could the defendant voluntarily
stay away from the trial and maintain that his conviction was
unconstitutional because of that absence.' ° Similarly, the right of
confrontation requires compliance with rules of procedure. The
defendant must give notice of an intended defense or of prospective
22
witnesses. Moreover, the defendant who testifies must submit to cross-
examination, 3 and cannot consult with counsel in the middle of the
examination. 4 And, while the prosecution cannot use illegally obtained
'6 United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 994-95 (11th Cir. 1985). A close reading
of the case shows that the court spent most of the opinion reviewing the facts to
establish that the statement was reliable and consistent with other evidence, rather
than an analysis leading to a new rule.
17 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2693.
98 U.S. 145, 158 (1879).
9 The opinion in Reynolds emphasized the defendant's deliberate tactical choice
about his defense. "Having the means of making the necessary explanation [of the
witness's location], and having every inducement to do so if he would, the
presumption is that he considered it better to rely upon the weakness of the case
made against him than to attempt to develop the strength of his own." Id. at 160.
20 Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 472 (1900).
21 Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991) (holding that the defendant does not
have a right to ignore a notice of defense rule).
22 Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988) (holding that the Compulsory
Process Clause does not create absolute bar to the exclusion of witness for failure to
comply with state's rule requiring witnesses to be identified).
2' Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1900) (holding a defendant
electing to testify must submit to cross-examination).
214 Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 284 (1989) (holding the right to the assistance of
counsel does not include consultation with counsel between direct and cross-
examination).
2009]
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evidence in its case in chief, it may impeach the defendant when his
testimony is inconsistent with this evidence.25 And of course the
defendant must comport himself appropriately, or face exclusion from
26the courtroom. The Court in Davis tightly linked the forfeiture rule to
the manipulation of the judicial process.
[W]hen defendants seek to undermine the judicial process by
procuring or coercing silence from witnesses and victims, the Sixth
Amendment does not require courts to acquiesce. While
defendants have no duty to assist the State in proving their guilt,
they do have the duty to refrain from acting in ways that destroy the
integrity of the criminal-trial system.
27
These cases establish a broad principle of forfeiture by manipulation
that is applicable to all of the trial rights, notjust confrontation. They are
the true equitable basis for forfeiture founded on the maxim that the
defendant should not benefit from his own wrongful manipulation of the
judicial process.2" The Court even has applied the equitable principle to
the government when it sought to retry an acquitted defendant on the
theory that its defective indictment voided a claim of double jeopardy.29
This is a judicial response to manipulation of the trial process and
does not depend upon the common law in 1789, and all the uncertainties
that this symposium detailed. These precedents reflect the proper role of
constitutional rights. All defendants have constitutional rights regardless
of the crime charged, even if they make it harder for the prosecution to
obtain a conviction. In fact, that is their purpose.
At the same time, a particular defendant can lose a constitutional
right when he manipulates the trial process. The intentional attack on
the judicial process to gain an unfair advantage is the triggering act, not
the crime charged. That affront to the judicial process is the only basis
for eliminating a constitutional right, and easing the state's constitutional
obligations. Otherwise, constitutional rights would vary on the needs or
whims of the government and not the defendant. Under these
precedents, intent arises as an inherent requirement of the forfeiture of
25 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (holding that "Miranda" cannot
be a shield to allow the defendant to testify inconsistently with prior voluntary but
suppressed statements); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64-65 (1954) (holding
that defendant may be impeached with illegally seized and suppressed evidence).
26 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (holding that defendant could be
excluded from courtroom because of repeated outbursts).
27 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006) (emphasis in original).
2 8 The Court has cited the maxim where there was interference with the judicial
process. Allen, 397 U.S. at 349 (Brennan, J., concurring); Diaz v. United States, 223
U.S. 442, 457-58 (1912) (citing Falk v. United States, 15 App. D.C. 446, 454, 460
(D.C. Cir. 1899)); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 471-72 (citing Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879)).
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 667-68 (1896) (holding that the
prosecution cannot take advantage of its defective indictment to avoid claim of
double jeopardy when defendant was acquitted at first trial).
558 [Vol. 13:3
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constitutional rights, and not, as the critics of Giles claim, as an artifact of
the particular history of the common law. In fact, case law, as well as
history, independently support the intent requirement.
III. CRAWFORD AND GILES IN CONTEXT
A. Crawford and Giles Have a Limited Effect
Much of the rhetoric about Crawford and Giles is overwrought with
claims that these cases will have devastating effects on prosecutions for
domestic violence, and perhaps crimes against children. While Crawford
may have revolutionized the Confrontation Clause's approach to hearsay,
its effect, as a practical matter, is likely to be small. Testimonial hearsay
is generally limited to statements made to government agents during the
investigation of a crime. Statements made to the police during an
32emergency response, or to third parties at any time are outside the
definition of testimonial hearsay and are admissible, subject to the
requirements of an exception to the rule against hearsay.33 Although
some testimonial statements may be excluded, many comparable
statements to nongovernment actors are admissible.
'0 Five of the seven amicus briefs in support of the State of California made these
claims. Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n to Prevent Sexual Abuse of Children's Nat'l Child
Protection Training Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Giles v.
California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008) (No. 07-6053); Amicus Curiae Brief of the Battered
Women's Justice Project and Other Domestic Violence Org. in Support of
Respondent, Giles, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (No. 07-6053); Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Counsel
for Children and the Am. Prof'l Soc'y on the Abuse of Children as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent, Giles, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (No. 07-6053); Brief of Richard D.
Friedman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Giles, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (No. 07-
6053); Brief of the Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project to
End Domestic Violence, Legal Moinefituln, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Giles, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (No. 07-6053).
" Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009), may be the exception
because the holding that reports from crime labs are testimonial requires the
prosecution to provide an opportunity to cross-examine the technician. However,
that decision does not involve forfeiture by wrongdoing.
12 Davis, 547 U.S. at 821-22; Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2693-94.
" Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2693. There are jurisdictions, however, that hold that the
forfeiture of confrontation also forfeits any evidence objections. See United States v.
White, 116 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1281
(1st Cir. 1996) (finding defendants' "misconduct waived not only their confrontation
rights but also their hearsay objections, thus rendering a special finding of reliability
superfluous"); United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding if a
defendant forfeits his or her right to confrontation, he or she a fortiori waives any
hearsay objection). State courts have also followed this approach. Devonshire v.
United States, 691 A.2d 165, 168-69 (D.C. 1997); State v. Hallum, 606 N.W.2d 351,
358 (Iowa 2000).
" While it may be odd that the Confrontation Clause addresses only victim
hearsay to police officers, and not the same statements made to civilians, it is
consistent with the Court's theory of the Confrontation Clause. Crawford was aimed,
in part, at limiting the government's ability to create evidence through its agent's
2009]
HeinOnline  -- 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 559 2009
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
The limited impact of Giles on prosecutions can be seen in a special
sample of cases. In preparing for oral argument in Giles, I reviewed the
ten state supreme court decisions and one opinion from a federal court
of appeals that had addressed the intent issue and that created the split
in the case law requiring Supreme Court review.3' These eleven cases
included prosecutions for domestic violence, homicides, child sexual
assaults and witness tampering in general crimes. The admissibility of
these testimonial statements apparently was important enough to appeal
to the highest state court, and a federal court of appeals. Examination of
the facts shows that Crawford and Giles can be satisfied in several ways, and
rarely prevent a conviction.
In two cases, the statements were not testimonial as later defined in
Davis, so the challenged statements would be admissible without
considering forfeiture. In four cases, there were comparable victim
statements to nongovernment actors, so the same evidence would be
presented to the jury.37 Two others had proof of the intent to prevent the
witness from testifying that satisfied the forfeiture rule . 3 In the federal
case, which was final before Giles, the exclusion of the testimonial
statement of a prior incident would not have affected the conviction
statements, rather than present the witness at trial. When the victim is unavailable to
testify, reliance on civilian hearsay statements does restrict the government's ability to
create evidence through its own agents. The prosecution must find and produce a
witness unaffiliated with the government. A civilian witness, unlike a government
agent, is not likely to be as experienced or skilled at testifying, nor clothed with the
authority and perceived neutrality of a police officer. The witness's potential biases or
relationship to the victim are more easily identified and considered by the jury, which
is in a better position to evaluate such testimony.
'5 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12-14, Giles, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (No. 07-6053).
3 State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 323-24 (W. Va. 2006) (remanding case to
determine if statements made by victim to neighbor at scene were testimonial); State
v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 794 (Kan. 2004) (statement to decedent at scene identifying
defendant would satisfy responding to emergency requirement, perhaps the dying
declaration, and homicide was witnessed by others).
17 People v. Stechly, 870 N.E.2d 333, 366 (Ill. 2007) (statements of child witness
to mother nontestimonial, and statements to police and nurse were testimonial);
State v. Romero, 156 P.3d 694 (N.M. 2007) (statements victim made to mother and to
friend, and officer's description of her at scene admissible although her grand jury
testimony and recorded statement were not); State v. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d 518, 536
(Wis. 2007) (statements made to neighbor and son's teacher nontestimonial, and
statements to officer and letter to neighbor were testimonial); State v. Mason, 162
P.3d 396, 405 (Wash. 2007) (harmless error in admitting statements to police when
comparable statements to roommate, supervisor, treating physician, and sister, as well
as DNA evidence linked him with the murder).
" Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 174-75 (Mass. 2005) (remanding
for trial court to review for the first time recorded conversations between defendant
and witness regarding arrangements for witness not to testify); State v. Fields, 679
N.W.2d 341, 347 (Minn. 2004) (intent to prevent testimony established).
[Vol. 13:3
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because the defendant conceded the murder and only argued that he
was not guilty of first degree murder because of intoxication. 9
In two of the three remaining cases, Gies was not decisive. The
Colorado Supreme Court held that a videotaped statement of a child
assault victim was testimonial and affirmed the reversal of the defendant's
conviction in People v. Moreno.40 The child was unavailable because of the
stress of testifying, so the videotape might have been the key evidence.
However, before trial, the defense had moved to depose the child outside
the presence of the defendant and the motion was denied. 4' Had the
defense offer been accepted, Crawford would have been satisfied and the
child's testimony admitted because there had been an opportunity for
cross-examination. The ultimate reason for the excluding the victim's
statement was not Crawford, but the unwillingness of the prosecution to
adapt to it. This is a self-inflicted wound. Professor Friedman has argued
that the state has an obligation to take steps to preserve the witness's
42
statements when there is a possibility that the witness will not testify.
Moreno is certainly one case where the government had some obligation
to accept the defense offer and could not complain if the testimonial
statement was subsequently excluded.
In one case, the state declined to prosecute on remand.43 The
defendant had been convicted of murdering his girlfriend but the
conviction was reversed because of an error in the instructions.44 After
the murder conviction, he was tried for an assault four months before
her death. The assault conviction was reversed because of the improper
admission of testimonial statements.45 On remand, the state dismissed the
assault charge, although the victim had made statements about the
assault to a friend and her mother on the day of the assault.4 6 The New
Mexico Supreme Court had previously noted that there was sufficient
'9 United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 367-68 (6th Cir. 2005) (opinion
was written before Davis was decided, and does not discuss whether the challenged
statement was made during an emergency and does not provide sufficient details to
resolve that question).
160 P.3d 242, 243 (Colo. 2007).
4' Id. at 243-44.
412 See, e.g., Posting of Richard D. Friedman to The Confrontation Blog, Forfeiture,
The Prosecutorial Duty to Mitigate, and Rae Carruth, http://confrontationright.
blogspot.com/2005/03/forfeiture-prosecutorial-duty-to.html (Mar. 4, 2005).
'3 State v. Romero, 156 P.3d 694 (N.M. 2007). E-mail from Will O'Connell,
Counsel on Appeal for Romero, to James F. Flanagan (Feb. 27, 2009) (on file with
author).
4' Romero, 156 P.3d at 696 (describing murder conviction).
4 Id. at 703. On retrial for the homicide, the defendant was convicted of
aggravated battery. E-mail from Will O'Connell, supra note 43. That may be an
appropriate verdict in light of the evidence of excessive drinking, mutual assault, and
admitted health problems of the decedent as recited by the court. State v. Romero,
112 P.3d 1113, 1114-15 (N.M. 2005).
46 State v. Romero, 133 P.3d 842, 847 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006), affd, 156 P.3d 694
(N.M. 2007).
2009]
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47
evidence to convict the defendant without the challenged statement.
Perhaps the pending retrial of the more serious charge of homicide was a
practical reason not to proceed, but it was not the exclusion of evidence
under Crawford or Giles.
Finally, I believe that a retrial of Giles might well result in an
acquittal, or at least a conviction on a lesser offense than first degree
murder. The testimonial statement about the prior assault was the only
testimony that the defendant harbored any animus toward the victim,
and it triggered a jury instruction that the intent to assault in the prior
48incident could be used to infer intent in the homicide. There was
substantial support for his self-defense claim since the evidence clearly
established that on the fatal evening the decedent continually sought a
confrontation with the defendant and his new girlfriend.49
These cases identify several ways in which Giles can be satisfied and a
conviction obtained. At the least, it is premature to claim that Giles will
undermine domestic violence prosecutions. Giles is a clear direction to
47 Romero, 156 P.3d at 700.
" The testimonial statement to the officer related a prior assault where the
defendant threatened to kill Ms. Avie if she left him. There is no evidence in the
record that the defendant was arrested although he was present when the police
arrived. Immediately after the oral argument before the Court, Ms. Marilyn
Burkhardt, counsel of record for Giles, talked with the former prosecutor in the
murder trial who had attended the argument. He reported to her that he recalled
that the complaint had been withdrawn. Conversation between author and Marilyn
G. Burkhardt, Defense Counsel for Giles, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 22, 2008). There
is reason to doubt the accuracy of the testimonial statement because Ms. Avie said
that she had been thrown to the floor and punched in the face. This violence was
inconsistent with the officer's statement that he saw no marks on her and felt only a
bump on her head. People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 436-37 (Cal. 2007), rev'd sub nom.
Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
" The California Supreme Court reported the defense evidence as follows:
Dwayne Giles had a new girlfriend, Ms. Tameta Munks. Ms. Avie continued to contact
him. On the night of the homicide, Ms. Avie called and wanted to visit him at his
grandmother's house where he was staying. Dwayne told her that Ms. Munks was
there and attempted to dissuade her, but she came nevertheless. At his urging Ms.
Munks left before Ms. Avie arrived and interrupted a small party playing records in
the garage. Tensions rose, and Dwayne ended the party and told everyone to leave.
Shortly thereafter, Ms. Avie apparently saw Ms. Munks and suspected she was
returning to the garage. Ms. Avie then left a friend, saying that she was going to
confront them both. There were no witnesses to the actual shooting. Dwayne testified
that she came at him, and he, aware of her repeated threats against him and the new
girlfriend, as well as evidence of her prior assaultive behavior against others, retrieved
a gun and shot her. He has more than a plausible claim of self-defense. In fact, he
had done everything possible to avoid a confrontation that was instigated by Ms. Avie,
unfortunately with fatal effect. Giles, 152 P.3d at 435-36. Those who think I might be
too close to the facts should reverse the genders and assume that Giles had been the
instigator, threatening and pursing Ms. Avie and her new boyfriend that evening.
On remand from the Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court, the
California Court of Appeal reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial on
February 25, 2009. People v. Giles, No. B166937, 2009 WL 457832 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb.
25, 2009).
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the police and prosecutors to work to produce the witness, or to establish
the elements of forfeiture, so there should be fewer cases where a
testimonial statement is essential to the prosecution. Certainly, the intent
requirement of Giles did not present a significant problem in many
prosecutions. Federal and state prosecutors routinely established the
necessary intent or purpose under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) (6)
before Crawford.0 Since these were generally organized crime or drug
conspiracy cases, with witness intimidation rivaling domestic violence
prosecutions, it indicates that there are no insurmountable problems in
establishing an intentional forfeiture in other cases. Finally, violations of
the Confrontation Clause are subject to the harmless error analysis. The
fact that harmless error has been found also indicates that use of
testimonial hearsay is often unnecessary.
B. Crawford, Giles and the Challenges of Domestic Violence
Giles is most relevant in nonfatal domestic violence prosecutions.
The complaining witness is physically capable of appearing in court, and
to establish forfeiture the prosecution must show that the purpose of the
wrongdoing was to prevent the witness from testifying, the goal of the
wrongdoing was in fact achieved, and the absence was not the result of
the witness's independent decision to stay away from the trial.
Complaining witnesses often are reluctant to testify against their
domestic partners in domestic violence prosecutions. The reasons are
complex. The lives of the witness and the defendant are intertwined by a
past relationship and often by the potential of some relationship in the
future. Witness intimidation by the defendant occurs in some cases, and
in others, the witness has independent reasons for refusing to testify that
are not chargeable to the defendant. Even in the best of times, testifying
is inherently stressful. "' The nature of criminal prosecutions also has an
effect. Most domestic violence prosecutions are misdemeanors, which
may have a lower claim on police and prosecutorial resources. The
impersonal nature of the prosecutorial process adversely affects many
potential witnesses. At the same time, social support programs have
53proven effective in improving witness appearance rates.
'0 See Flanagan, A Reach Exceeding its Grasp, supra note 12, at 485 & n.162.
5' See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 856 (1990) (finding that protections
for child witnesses are not available solely because of the normal anxiety of
testifying).
52 Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An Alternative
Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 552, 582 (2007).
" See JOANNE BELKNAP & DEE L. R. GRAHAM, FACTORS RELATED TO DOMESTIc
VIOLENCE COURT DISPOSITIONS IN A LARGE URBAN AREA: THE ROLE OF VICTIM/WITNESS
RELUCTANCE AND OTHER VARIABLES 171-74 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffilesl/nij/grants/184232.pdf (listing recommendations for reducing victim
reluctance to testify); Richard Devine, Targeting High Risk Domestic Violence Cases: The
Cook County, Chicago, Experience, 34 PROSECUTOR Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 30, 30-31
(explaining program that provided support to victims of domestic violence and
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The critical challenge for Giles is whether courts applying the
decision will properly distinguish cases where forfeiture is justified,
because there was proof of causation, from those where the witness's
failure to appear is not chargeable to the defendant because it was due to
an independent decision of the witness or the failure of the government
to produce the witness. There are very strong pressures to apply
forfeiture whenever possible. Giles has few friends, and many who believe
the case is an impediment to successful prosecutions of these types of
cases. Although obtaining the appearance of witnesses is a multifaceted
problem, the emphasis has been on using the forfeiture rule to admit
testimonial hearsay without the presence of the witness.
In my view, it is essential that the courts require specific
individualized proof not only of the defendant's purpose, but also of the
link between the wrongdoing and the witness's failure to appear.
Confrontation is a constitutional trial right, and one that goes to the
reliability and acceptability of the verdict. Hearsay is suspect as a matter
of evidence law, as well as the Constitution. As Justice Souter said, "[i]t
was, and is, reasonable to place the risk of untruth in an unconfronted,
out-of-court statement on a defendant who meant to preclude the testing
that confrontation provides."5 The forfeiture rule has never been
justified by the inherent reliability of the hearsay, and placing the risk of
untruth on the defendant without such proof increases the risk of a
wrongful conviction.56
Many have argued that the special circumstances of domestic
violence require a more lenient approach to the admissibility of
testimonial statements.b7 However, Justice Scalia is correct. There is
simply no way to have a special rule only for domestic violence cases.58
resulted in eighty percent of victims appearing for trial); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting
Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 783-818 (2005) (discussing various
proposals to maximize opportunities for cross-examination and the admission of
constitutionally permissible hearsay statements of victims of domestic violence).
54 The witness's motivation is often the desire to preserve emotional, financial,
and family connections, and identifying the true motivation may be difficult in many
cases. However, only wrongdoing supports forfeiture, and these other factors are not
wrongdoing. This is seen by presenting the issue in another context: one would not
find an executive unavailable as a witness if he declined to testify because it would
destroy a valuable (and legitimate) financial or social relationship with the target of
the testimony.
" Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2694 (2008) (Souter, J., concurring in
part).
56 See, e.g., Anthony Bocchino & David Sonenshein, Rule 804(b)(6)-The
Illegitimate Child of the Failed Liaison Between the Hearsay Rule and Confrontation Clause, 73
Mo. L. REv. 41 (2008) (arguing that the forfeiture rule lacks any traditional indicia of
trustworthiness).
-7 See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006) (noting that the states
and others argued that domestic violence cases required "greater flexibility in the use
of testimonial" hearsay).
m Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2693.
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Any precedents in the context of domestic violence will inevitably affect
application of the forfeiture rule in all other crimes. The conflict over
whether a witness will testify against a domestic partner (as well as the
opportunity for intimidation), comes from the preexisting relationship
between the defendant and the complaining witness. This relationship is
not unique to domestic violence. The same factors also describe many
other situations where witnesses are reluctant to testify, including
organized crime cases, business conspiracies, and crimes within a
neighborhood where people know both perpetrator and victim. Finally,
the number of domestic violence prosecutions, and opinions explaining
the forfeiture rulings, will drive the future of forfeiture. So, it is inevitable
that any precedent applied in domestic violence cases will also be applied
to forfeiture in all criminal cases.
I have argued that without an intent requirement, forfeiture is
inherently unlimited.' 9 It can, and will be, applied whenever there is any
plausible argument that the witness's failure to appear could be
connected to the defendant's wrongdoing. The State of California
argued that forfeiture applied in any homicide case, and others have
argued that forfeiture was appropriate in any domestic violence
prosecution.60 For similar reasons, now that intent is required, it is
equally important that the courts demand proof of the intent
requirement, and of the causation, in order to preserve the limited
nature of forfeiture. Otherwise, forfeiture will become a wholesale
exception to Crawford that will inevitably nullify any significant protection
against hearsay under the Confrontation Clause.
Finally, the failure to enforce the intent requirement in Giles has the
paradoxical effect of reducing confrontation because relying on
forfeiture may be easier for the prosecution than finding and producing
a witness. The prosecution gains in many cases when it admits absent
witness testimony because the real witness, with all the inevitable warts,
does not appear before the jury, and the critical testimony is presented
by an authority figure who presents a statement that cannot be qualified,
modified, or retracted.
IV. ISSUES IN ENFORCING GILES
A. The Critical Issues of Intent and Causation
The forfeiture doctrine requires proof of wrongdoing, proof that the
wrongdoing was intended to prevent the witness from testifying, and
proof that the wrongdoing did, in fact, prevent the appearance of the
Flanagan, Confrontation, Equity, and the Misnamed Exception, supra note 12, at
1231.
' See, e.g., Adam M. Krischer, "Though Justice May be Blind, It is Not Stupid":
Applying Common Sense to Crawford in Domestic Violence Cases, 38 PROSECUTOR, Nov.-
Dec. 2004, at 14 (arguing that perpetrators of domestic violence automatically
forfeited their right to confront victims).
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61witness. One critical issue is the proof of intent, and in particular,
whether it can be inferred solely from an abusive relationship. The
second critical issue is the causal link between the defendant's
wrongdoing and the witness's unavailability. This in turn has two
subparts: did the witness have independent reasons for not appearing,
and did the government fail in its obligation to produce the witness?
Either one, I maintain, prevents forfeiture from operating even if the
defendant had the requisite intent. Each of these points merits more
detailed examination below.
B. The Causal Link Between Intent to Harm the Witness and the Failure to
Appear
Davis states that the prosecution must establish the elements for
forfeiture by wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.2 What is
not clear is whether the prosecution must show that the defendant's
intention to prevent testimony was a factor, a significant factor, the
63
primary factor, or the sole factor, for his acts against the witness. A
similar question must be asked about the witness's motivation. Must the
wrongdoing be only a factor, a significant factor, the primary factor, or
the sole factor in the witness's refusal to testify? For the reasons
developed below, both issues should be resolved by a "but for" test. That
is, the judge should determine whether the wrongdoing would have
occurred "but for" the defendant's desire to prevent the witness from
testifying. The court then would determine whether, "but for" the
intentional wrongdoing, the witness would have testified.
There are only scattered references defining this connection in the
case law. A few courts have held that the defendant could be held to have
intended to prevent testimony so long as the victim's potential testimony
64
was "a factor" in the decision to act against the witness. Another
formulation asks whether witness intimidation was in "any way" a
65motivation. At the same time, courts have specifically rejected a
requirement that the witness tampering be the sole motive for
66intimidating the witness.
61 This formulation is taken from the language of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which codified the forfeiture rule. FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (6). See also Davis, 547 U.S. at
833.
62 Davis, 547 U.S. at 833.
61 Justice Breyer adverted to this issue in the Giles dissent. 128 S. Ct. at 2699
(BreyerJ., dissenting).
United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 654 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v.Johnson, 219 F.3d 349,
356 (4th Cir. 2000).
State v. Romero, 133 P.3d 842, 856 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006), afJ'd, 156 P.3d 694
(N.M. 2007).
Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 654; Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1279.
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The "a factor" test is vastly over-inclusive, and if strictly applied would
all but eliminate the intent element of the forfeiture doctrine because it
can be satisfied so easily. It requires only minimal evidence and does not
require consideration of contrary evidence. Nor does it require that the
court weigh all of the evidence, pro and con, and conclude which reason,
more likely than not, was the motivation for the defendant's acts. Applied
strictly, forfeiture could be found whenever intimidation and refusal
occur although the wrongdoing was not a primary, or even a significant,
reason for the defendant's actions or the witness's absence.
The preponderance standard is often viewed as a "more probably so
than not" test.67 This is the appropriate test for causation under Giles. The
preponderance test requires a finding of the most likely cause. Forfeiture
is appropriate if the most likely motivation for the act was to prevent the
person from appearing as a witness, and if that act was the most likely
reason for the witness not appearing. Stated another way, would the
wrongdoing have occurred but for the potential to testify, and would the
witness have appeared but for the wrongdoing? The "but for" test
properly asks whether the wrongdoing was the predominant factor in theh 1 . 68
chain of causation. Finally, the intent should be determined at the time
of the defendant's wrongdoing, and the witness's motivation at the time
of the failure to appear.
There are several reasons for articulating the burden in this way. At
stake is a constitutional right to object to constitutionally-suspect
testimonial hearsay and the reliability of the verdict. It is important for
the trial judge to examine the evidence carefully and to consider
alternative evidence of causation. The only significant and detailed
examination of the evidence will be by the trial judge. The appellate
court will review under an abuse of discretion standard, and, almost
certainly, will defer to the trial judge. Finally, the prosecution has an
independent obligation to produce the witness, and there is a separate
question of whether the witness could have appeared if the police had
made the appropriate efforts, rather than relying on the expectation that
forfeiture would be applied.
C. Strengthening the Prosecution's Burden of Establishing the "Unavailability"
of the Witness
The prosecution has the independent constitutional obligation to
produce the witness for testimony in its case in chief. The current law on
the government's obligation to prove the witness's unavailability is
ambiguous in form and lenient in application. The Supreme Court held
that the government had a "good faith" obligation to obtain the witness
67 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 3.3, at 109 (3rd
ed. 2003).
" Flanagan, Foreshadowing the Future, supra note 12 at 896-97.
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for trial in Barber v. Page.69 The government was required to use the writ
of habeas corpus ad testificandum in Barber to produce a witness known to be
in prison in a neighboring state, but was excused from efforts to return a
witness from Sweden in Mancusi v. Stubbs.7 ° In Ohio v. Roberts, the
government's delivery of a subpoena to the home of the witness's parents
in Ohio was deemed sufficient, although it was known that she was in
California." This is inconsistent with the language of the opinion:
The law does not require the doing of a futile act. Thus, if no
possibility of procuring the witness exists (as, for example, the
witness' intervening death), "good faith" demands nothing of the
prosecution. But if there is a possibility, albeit remote, that
affirmative measures might produce the declarant, the obligation of
good faith may demand their effectuation."
In practice, the lower courts seem to accept a wide variety of excuses
from the government for the witness's unavailability.
73
Crawford and Giles require that the unavailability standard be
reexamined and strengthened for at least two reasons. First, the
constitutional requirements for hearsay were unformed when Barber and
Mancusi were decided. Then, Crawford and Davis rejected the reliability
standard adopted by Roberts in 1980. Consequently, these cases should be
reexamined in light of Crawfords emphasis on the opportunity for cross-
examination. Moreover, each defendant in those cases had some prior
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, so the essentials of
confrontation occurred, at least under the constitutional standards of the
74time. To the extent that the hearsay was reliable, and also subject to
some prior cross-examination, the Court had little reason to seriously
consider whether the government had discharged its obligation to
produce the witness. Consequently, the Court was willing to accept rather
perfunctory efforts of the police at that time.
Crawford eliminated those props to the "good faith" standard. All
testimonial hearsay is unconfronted and reliability is no longer the
69 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968).
70 408 U.S. 204, 211-13, 216 (1972).
7' 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
72 Id. at 74.
7' Raymond LaMagna, (Re)Constitutionalizing Confrontation: Reexamining
Unavailability and the Value of Live Testimony, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 1499, 1550-52 (2006)
(discussing examples of the minimal standards for determining unavailability).
14 Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722 (1968) (noting that confrontation can be
excused because "cross-examination initially afforded provides substantial
compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement," but finding
no effort to obtain attendance through available means); see generally Mancusi, 408
U.S. 204 (challenge to conviction enhancement based upon prior trial where trial
testimony of witness admitted in lieu of obtaining now foreign domiciled witness to
appear); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 166-67 (1970) (preliminary hearing
testimony admitted where witness was subject to cross-examination and claimed lack
of memory); Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (preliminary hearing testimony of absent witness
admitted, and the reliability standard announced).
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constitutional standard. The only protection provided by the
Confrontation Clause is the procedural opportunity to confront the
witness. The constitutional protection is dependent on whether the
government produces or is excused from producing the witness at trial.
This in turn requires that the standard for establishing unavailability be
strengthened because of the perverse incentive for the police and
prosecutors to avoid seeking the witness when the testimonial hearsay
can be admitted under the forfeiture rule. In many cases testimonial
hearsay has significant advantages for the government. A strong standard
for unavailability directs the police and prosecutor to exhaust all
available means of locating and producing the witness and ultimately
results in more confrontation.7
I suggest that the "good faith effort" of Barber is inadequate for the
times because it focuses on the attitude of law enforcement, but not the
reasonableness of its efforts. Moreover, the Supreme Court's case law
seems limited only to requiring the use of available judicial procedures 6
This is a particularly narrow approach to the obligation of producing
witnesses when it is now clear that support services to complaining
witnesses are particularly helpful in encouraging the needed testimony.7
Due diligence is a better standard because it shifts the focus from
good intentions to objective steps the prosecution could have taken in
locating and producing the witness. The reality is that the prosecution
often successfully uses investigative techniques to find reluctant witnesses,
so there is a readily available objective standard to determine whether the
prosecution has satisfied its obligations. Today, with cell phones that
reveal locations, due diligence requires more than reliance on the
judicial process of a subpoena. It requires attention to the needs of the
witness. It is well established that support programs for witnesses improve
75 The unavailability requirement has not escaped the attention of the advocates
for a broadened forfeiture rule. In an Essay apparently written before Giles, one
commentator proposed that any act by the defendant that makes testifying more
difficult for the witness is sufficient. Aaron R. Petty, The Unavailability Requirement, 102
Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 239, 243 (2008). This conclusion was reached by comparing
the rationale for admitting prior sworn testimony with that of forfeited testimony,
without noting the fundamental differences between admitting sworn testimony
subject to cross-examination and admitting unsworn and unconfronted hearsay. Nor
does the author consider the inherent institutional values of confrontation in
insuring the reliability and fairness of a trial, which is the purpose of the Sixth
Amendment.
7' The Court required the prosecution to use the writ of habeas corpus ad
testificandum in Barber. 390 U.S. at 724. However, in Mancusi, attendance was excused
because of the lack of procedures to bring foreign witnesses into this country. 408
U.S. at 211-13. Roberts found the useless act of delivering a subpoena to a location
where the witness admittedly had not resided for years was acceptable. 448 U.S. at 74-
75.
77 Devine, supra note 53, at 30 (describing program that produced appearance
rates of complaining witnesses of eighty percent, and conviction rates in
misdemeanor cases of ninety percent).
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appearance rates. The simple expedient of providing transportation
expenses should be required. The government simply can't wait until the
last minute to address the problem of witnesses who are known to be
reluctant. If the Confrontation Clause is to be a meaningful protection,
the unavailability standard must be sufficiently rigorous to produce the
witness in all but the extreme cases.
A corollary of the government's enhanced obligation of the
prosecution to produce the witness may be the duty to provide an
alternative to confrontation at trial, as argued by Professor Friedman.8
The prosecution's obligation to provide an opportunity for cross-
examination pre-trial fits well into the concept of due diligence. When
the government is aware that there are risks that the witness might not
appear at trial, it must respond with efforts to provide confrontation by
79other means.
V. THE INFERENCE FROM A RELATIONSHIP INVOLVING
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
A. Giles Requires Individualized Proof of Intent
There are many cases where the prosecution can establish the
defendant's intent was to keep the witness from the courtroom by the
witness's8 ° or defendant's own statements.8 ' The more problematic
situation, and the one where a strict standard of proof is essential, occurs
when there is no evidence in the record that a prosecution is pending, or
that the defendant has used force to prevent the witness from seeking the
help of the authorities. That is, there is no individualized evidence of
intent or causation, but there have been incidents of domestic violence
between them.
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court, Justice Souter's concurrence,
and Justice Breyer's dissent in Giles addressed the inference from an
abusive relationship. I read the opinion for the Court, and the
concurring opinion of Justice Souter, to require substantially more than
mere proof of an abusive relationship. The Court, in fact, requires that,
over and above the existence of an abusive relationship, that there be
evidence that is sufficient to support the inference that the defendant's
78 See supra note 42, and accompanying text.
See, e.g., People v. Moreno, 160 P.3d 242 (Colo. 2007) (noting that prosecution
rejected defense request to interview child witness out of the presence of the
defendant).
so See, e.g., United States v. Montague, 421 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2005)
(witness related conversations with defendant urging her not to testify against him).
8" See, e.g., Vasquez v. People, 173 P.3d 1099, 1105 (Colo. 2007) (affirming
forfeiture because of defendant's statement that he killed her because she "set [him]
up"); Pena v. People, 173 P.3d 1107, 1110 (Colo. 2007) (affirming forfeiture because
of defendant's efforts to persuade her not to testify and a motive to kill because of
pending charges).
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goal was to interfere with the juridical processes by keeping the witness
away.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, articulates a requirement of
individual proof, and rejects simplistic, generalized inferences:
The domestic-violence context is, however, relevant for a separate
reason. Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a
victim from resorting to outside help, and include conduct
designed to prevent testimony to police officers or cooperation in
criminal prosecutions. Where such an abusive relationship
culminates in murder, the evidence may support a finding that the
crime expressed the intent to isolate the victim and to stop her
from reporting abuse to the authorities or cooperating with a
criminal prosecution-rendering her prior statements admissible
under the forfeiture doctrine. Earlier abuse, or threats of abuse,
intended to dissuade the victim from resorting to outside help
would be highly relevant to this inquiry, as would evidence of
ongoing criminal proceedings at which the victim would have been
expected totestify. This is not, as the dissent charges, post, at 2708,
nothing more than "knowledge-based intent.""'
Justice Scalia's test is rooted in the purpose of the forfeiture
doctrine. Constitutional rights can be forfeited only when there is
evidence that the defendant was manipulating the juridical process. The
defendant's acts must be sufficient to support the inference that he
sought to prevent the victim from cooperating with the police or criminal
prosecution. The determination of intent or purpose must be viewed in
the context of all of the facts; particularly relevant are prior threats to
isolate from outside help, and an ongoing criminal proceeding where the
victim was expected to testify, which supplies an obvious motive.
Justice Scalia explicitly rejects any suggestion that this is the
"knowledge-based intent," argued by Justice Breyer, where the defendant
must know that a homicide will prevent the witness from testifying. The
rejection of Breyer's argument necessarily rejects any proof of intent
based solely on the nature of the crime of domestic violence.
The concurring opinion of Justice Souter, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, supports this view of the inference to be drawn from a history
of domestic violence.83
8' Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2693 (2008).
83 The concurring justices agreed with the Court's opinion in all but Part
11(D) (2), where Justice Scalia criticizes Justice Breyer's view as one that would make
constitutional rights "subject to whatever exceptions courts from time to time
consider 'fair."' Id. at 2692. Souter and Ginsburg are not in full agreement with
Justice Scalia's predominant reliance on history at the time of the adoption of the Bill
of Rights. Although they agree that history supports the intent requirement, they
note that "today's understanding of domestic abuse had no apparent significance at
the time of the Framing, and there is no early example of the forfeiture rule
operating in that circumstance." Id. at 2694-95 (SouterJ., concurring in part).
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The second [reason in favor of the Court's view of forfeiture] is the
absence from the early material of any reason to doubt that the
element of intention would normally be satisfied by the intent
inferred on the part of the domestic abuser in the classic abusive
relationship, which is meant to isolate the victim from outside help,
including the aid of law enforcement and the judicial process. If the
evidence for admissibility shows a continuing relationship of this
sort, it would make no sense to suggest that the oppressing
defendant miraculously abandoned the dynamics of abuse the
instant before he killed his victim, say in a fit of anger.
8
1
Read with its qualifications, it is in accord with Justice Scalia's
opinion for the Court. The intent to prevent testimony is established by
proof of an abusive relationship that is meant to isolate a victim from
help, including help from the authorities or judicial process. Justice
Souter adds that when a defendant has isolated a victim from the judicial
process, that intent would not necessarily be negated by an impulsive
homicide.. " The concurrence deduces the necessary intent to prevent
testimony from the acts in a "classic abusive relationship" intended to
isolate the witness from the authorities. Clearly, many other relationships
do not meet the as yet undefined "classic abusive relationship."
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Kennedy and Stevens, rejected a
requirement of proving the necessary intent in favor of presuming it, as
the logical consequence of the act of homicide is the unavailability of the
witness. In cases of intimate abuse, however, Justice Breyer reads Justice
Souter's concurrence to mean that a history of domestic violence is
sufficient to establish intent, presumably on the theory that a natural and
probable consequence of domestic violence is that the witness will not
84 Id. at 2695 (Souter,J., concurring in part).
85 id.
86 There are significant problems with Justice Breyer's theory of inferred intent.
First, it is only a presumption, and the Constitution prohibits mandatory
presumptions, so it is only a permissive inference of dubious validity without proof.
Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979). More importantly, this
presumption is used in criminal law to infer intent from the immediate and direct
consequence of a voluntary criminal act. Justice Breyer's example is that a defendant,
intending to kill one person by bombing a plane, cannot escape criminal liability for
all those that also died, although he did not directly intend to kill them. The strength
of that inference, and its viability under the Due Process Clause, however, declines
the further one moves away in space and time from the intentional act. It is
reasonable to extend the defendant's intent to kill a specific person on the plane to
the unknown passenger in seat 23A because it is an immediate consequence of the
bombing. However, it is not reasonable to infer that because of the bomb the
defendant also intended to keep his victim, and any other passenger, from eating at a
restaurant to be opened six months later, and then making the inferred intention to
keep the victim from that lunch the decisive finding in denying a constitutional right
necessary for the reliability of the verdict. That is exactly what inferred intent does,
however, when wrongdoing committed without any relationship to the judicial
process is used to infer intent to keep the witness away from trial. The logic is strained
to the breaking point and was rightly rejected in the context of the forfeiture rule.
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appear at trial, even if physically able to testify. Justice Breyer would find
forfeiture on substantially less than would the Court, perhaps only on a
showing that the defendant committed an act of domestic abuse
involving the witness from which it might be foreseen that the witness
881would not appear at trial.
The Court, of course rejected the dissent's position. Something
more than domestic violence or an abusive relationship is required.
Evidence must establish that the defendant's acts were aimed at
controlling the victim, and preventing her from seeking the assistance of
the authorities. There are many cases where this can be shown, but it is
equally true that there are many cases where the wrongdoing, violence or
otherwise, does not rise to that level, and where forfeiture is
inappropriate. Likewise, there are cases where the witness's behavior is
based upon private considerations that are not chargeable to the
defendant.
B. Some Cautionary Thoughts on the Use of Expert Testimony to Prove
Causation and Intent
The absence of any independent evidence of the defendant's intent
inevitably will lead to attempts to use expert testimony to establish both
motivation and causation. This should be approached with caution
because of the great potential for producing error by substituting
generalizations for specific proof of the individual. Too casual an
approach to expert testimony on intent is another means by which that
critical requirement may be eroded and confrontation reduced. I offer
only an overview, with all the inherent limitations that implies, in the
expectation that it will lead to a more detailed discussion on this topic.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires an examination of the
reliability of the principles, the sufficiency of the data, and the reliability
of its application in the particular case. There are significant issues in
each of these categories. The most problematic aspect of expert
testimony is that it is likely to offer a simplistic approach to the issue of
causation, most likely a claim that domestic violence is about control in
the relationship, and hence any wrongdoing must have been meant to
87 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2709 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
88 The dissent might be read to be consistent with the opinions of Justice Scalia
and Justice Souter. Justice Breyer reads Justice Souter's concurrence "to say that a
showing of domestic abuse is sufficient to call into play the protection of the
forfeiture rule in a trial for murder of the domestic abuse victim." Id. at 2708. In
conclusion, Justice Breyer states: "Insofar as Justice SOUTER's rule in effect presumes
'purpose' based on no more than evidence of a history of domestic violence, I agree
with it." Id. at 2709. Read together, they could mean that a showing of domestic abuse
is sufficient to raise the issue of forfeiture (but it is not conclusive evidence for
forfeiture) unless the history of domestic violence is such that it establishes the intent
to control the victim, so that it can be inferred he did not want her to testify. The
dissent's willingness to presume intent based upon the nature of the crime is
inconsistent with this view.
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keep the witness from testifying. There is, however, no agreed theory
about the psychology causing domestic violence, or the motivation of
those involved. 9
Moreover, what is established about the motivation is limited. For
example, the first study that claims to provide quantitative evidence
suggesting assaults by men on female partners are more likely to involve a
control motive than other assaults, also states that the authors "cannot
determine for any particular case whether control is the only motive, the
dominant motive, or a subordinate motive."9 ° Yet that is the most
important question in forfeiture by wrongdoing. The authors also note
that statistical evidence on the control motive is almost nonexistent, and
the studies that exist are based on self-reporting, limited samples, and
yielded inconsistent results. "1 These are the conclusions of one Article, of
course, but they do suggest some fundamental weaknesses in the control
hypothesis.
There are issues of definition. Domestic violence is a continuum
from isolated verbal taunts to repeated assaults, and in some cases,
intentional homicides. Some appropriate definition of domestic violence
is critical and must be used consistently. One test used by psychologists
asks whether the person ever "pushed, grabbed or shoved; slapped,
kicked, bit, hit with a fist or an object; beat up; threatened with a knife or
gun; or used a knife or gun against your partner?"92 One incident
apparently constitutes abuse, and provides at least an argument for an
abusive relationship because it is between domestic partners. The
definition is so broad that any inference would be over-inclusive in the
context of a criminal trial.
There is also the "fit" between the expert's background and
testimony and the particular facts of the case before the court. There is
'9 See Burke, supra note 52, at 569 (citing NEILJACOBSON &JOHN GoTrMAN, WHEN
MEN BAT-ER WOMEN: NEW INSIGHTS INTO ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS 55 (1998));
see also DONALD G. DUTroN, RETHINKING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 62-129 (2006)
(reviewing the various theories of wife assault).
90 Ronald B. Felson & Steven F. Messner, The Control Motive in Intimate Partner
Violence, 63 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 86, 91 (2000).
9' Id. at 87.
92 DONALD G. DUTTrON & SuSAN K. GOLANT, THE BA-rrERER: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
PROFILE 22 (1995) (describing a question of the Tactic Conflicts Scale).
" Another example of broad generalizations is the repeated statement that a
high percentage of victims do not cooperate with the prosecution. See, e.g., People v.
Brown, 94 P.3d 574, 576 (Cal. 2004) (noting that an expert testified that eighty to
eighty-five percent of victims recant at some point); People v. Gomez, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d
101, 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that an expert testified that eighty to eighty-five
percent of domestic violence witnesses, recant, change or minimize the incident).
That assertion is an over-generalization, and does not define what cooperation,
recant, or minimize means. It does not provide any information about how many
witnesses do testify for the prosecution, nor how many do not and the reason for the
refusal. The source of this information is experiential witnesses who do not cite a
source for it, which implies that it is an estimate, at best.
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research on the small group of serial batterers, but conclusions based on
extreme behavior are appropriate for only that restricted class, and not
for the great majority of cases.94 In most cases of forfeiture, there is also
an important and inherent limitation on the use of expert testimony
regarding the motivation of the defendant and of the now unavailable
witness. Neither can be interviewed by the expert, so any information
about them, and their motivation, will necessarily be provided by others
and subject to substantial errors of emphasis, omission, and reliability.
There is no independent way to verify the information is correct and
complete. As this short discussion indicates, expert testimony fits the
particular case only when the data on which the testimony is based clearly
matches the facts of the particular case in severity, frequency, and the
psychological profile of the defendant. In other cases that lack such a fit,
the probative value is substantially less, and in some cases, it is
nonexistent.
I have some concerns about the utility of this expert testimony. The
basis of the testimony is prior bad acts which have a recognized
prejudicial potential9 If expert testimony is offered solely as background
information, as much syndrome evidence is, there is a substantial
problem of guilt by diagnostic association rather than actual proof. True,
the evidence is presented solely to the judge for the pretrial ruling on
forfeiture, but that does not eliminate the concerns. If it is offered
because the judge is unfamiliar with domestic violence, the evidence
retains its impact. This is the same concern as expressed in the Court's
opinion in Giles about the effect of pre-trial judgments of guilt.96 If the
judge is experienced, then what is its value in that case? I also offer the
observation that expert testimony is a two-edged sword for the
prosecution. The focus has been on the defendant's motivation, but the
witness's motivation is equally important. Whatever standard is used for
determining the admission of expert testimony by the prosecution also
must be available for the defense. I strongly favor individualized proof of
intent and causation in both instances, rather than the generalizations of
expert testimony.
Forfeiture by wrongdoing is an equitable principle, but equity is a
two-way street. One may also question the justification for resorting to
expert testimony when there are so often comparable victim statements
available from nongovernment witnesses, or nontestimonial statements.
Why is expert testimony necessary? If the reason is that it is easier for the
prosecution to find one expert, than actually prove unavailability in
9' See DuVroN & GOLANT, supra note 92, at 22-23.
15 Myrna S. Raeder, The Better Way: The Role of Batterers' Profiles and Expert "Social
Framework" Background in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 147,
160-61 (1997) (noting that the weight of authority views batterers' profiles as
impermissible character evidence); see also FED. R. EVID. 404.
96 Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2686, 2692, 2694 (SouterJ., concurring).
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individual cases or make the effort to produce the witness, that is
certainly inadequate.
Finally, the issue at its core is not one of psychology, but a
determination of what the legal standard should be in establishing the
intent to prevent testimony and the motivation of the unavailable
witness.97 Only the intent to isolate the witness from the authorities is
sufficient under Giles. Acts that do not amount at least to isolation from
the authorities are insufficient. Similarly, for the witness, the issue is not
whether testifying is stressful, whether it flows from the witness's personal
desires, or whether there is a lack of due diligence by the prosecution,
but whether it flows from the wrongdoing. In my view, legal
considerations require a high standard of proof on all of these issues
because confrontation is a trial right essential to the integrity of the
judicial process.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Giles, Justice Scalia, as he did with the definition of "testimonial"
in Crawford, left the lower courts to sort out the means and methods of
proving intent and causation. Crawford emphasized the importance of
confrontation, and Giles reflects that importance because it requires an
intentional interference with the judicial process. Violence between
intimate partners presents the most difficult challenge for the continued
vitality of the purpose requirement of Giles. Unless careful attention is
paid to the issues involved, the essentially limited nature of the forfeiture
rule may be eroded by minimal standards of proof on its critical
elements. We do have an intent requirement ifwe can keep it. And, if we
cannot, forfeiture will become a broad exception in practice, and
Crawford will have a very limited effect. Indeed, the result might be that
the forfeiture rule will be the means of actually reducing confrontation.
Failing to require individualized proof will expand this exception,
undermine Crawford, and provide an incentive to use hearsay rather than
focus on bringing the witness to the court.
"' FED. R. EVID. 704(b) (prohibiting expert testimony on the ultimate issue of the
defendant's mental state in a criminal trial). This reflects the concern that expert
opinion may have a disproportionate effect on the jury.
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